Abstract-Many key predistribution (KP) protocols have been proposed and are well accepted in randomly deployed wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Being distributed and localized, they are perceived to be scalable as node density and network dimension increase. While it is true in terms of communication/computation overhead, their scalability in terms of security performance is unclear. In this paper, we conduct a detailed study on this issue. In particular, we define a new metric called Resilient Connectivity (RC) to quantify security performance in WSNs. We then conduct a detailed analytical investigation on how KP protocols scale with respect to node density and network dimension in terms of RC in randomly deployed WSNs. Based on our theoretical analysis, we state two scaling laws of KP protocols. Our first scaling law states that KP protocols are not scalable in terms of RC with respect to node density. Our second scaling law states that KP protocols are not scalable in terms of RC with respect to network dimension. In order to deal with the unscalability of the above two scaling laws, we further propose logical and physical group deployment, respectively. We validate our findings further using extensive theoretical analysis and simulations.
Currently, the well accepted approach for key management in WSNs is based on the idea of key predistribution [1] . In the simplest version, each sensor is predistributed with distinct keys randomly chosen from a large pool of keys, and nodes are deployed randomly in the network. After deployment, neighboring nodes use predistributed keys to establish a pairwise key between them either directly or using other nodes as proxies. The redundancy in key predistribution ( keys per sensor) enables nodes overcome deployment randomness, helping discover secure neighbors and proxies. Many key management protocol variants have been proposed based on key predistribution (called KP protocols) [1] - [11] etc., each one improving features like connectivity, resilience, overhead, etc. Note that while each KP protocol variant is different in terms of certain parameters and features (discussed in detail later), the idea of predistributing keys to sensors and pairwise key establishment among the sensors is the same in all variants.
Motivation: Key management protocols in WSNs need to be scalable, since there are missions where thousands of nodes are deployed. There are two key properties that determine network size in WSNs: node density (average number of neighbors per node) and network dimension (geographical size of the network). Being distributed and localized, communication and computational overhead increase in KP protocols is mild when node density increases. With higher node density, it is believed that security performance improves, as nodes can now find more secure neighbors and proxies. In fact, many KP protocols assume high node density ( 20 neighbors per node) with the notion that it enhances performance [1] , [2] . From the perspective of network dimension also, KP protocols are generally believed to be scalable.
In the context of secure communications, the WSN is under attack. As such, while an increase in the number of nodes helps the network side, it also enables attackers to capture more nodes (to disclose more keys) and monitor more links in the network. There is, hence, a tug of war between the network and attackers in terms of how extra nodes (and keys) are leveraged by each other. Because of this war between two conflicting entities, scalability of KP protocols in terms of security performance is not clear yet. In this paper, we address this issue via the following five contributions.
1) We define a new metric called Resilient Connectivity (RC) to quantify security performance for all KP protocols. Formally, RC is the probability that two neighboring nodes can establish a secure pairwise key between them under attacks. This metric naturally considers both connectivity and resilience, two standard metrics used to evaluate security performance of KP protocols in previous literature. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to propose a unified metric to evaluate the security performance of KP protocols. 2) We conduct a comprehensive survey on state-of-the-art KP protocols, and make a classification of all of them. In particular, we first identify and abstract the parameters that capture all features impacting RC in any KP protocol. Then we classify all KP protocols based on different particular instances of these parameters, and derive expressions for all the parameters in all KP protocols. 3) We rigorously derive a general expression for RC as the basis of our scalability study. Specifically, based on the derivations of the parameters that impact RC in all KP parameters, we obtain a general form expression of RC based on these parameters. Such general expression allows us to study KP protocol scalability effectively, and draw general conclusions for all protocols. 4) We conduct a detailed analytical investigation on how KP protocols scale with node density and network dimension in terms of RC in randomly deployed WSNs. Based on our theoretical analysis, we state two scaling laws for security performance of KP protocols. Our first law states that KP protocols are not scalable in terms of RC with respect to node density. Our second law states that KP protocols are not scalable in terms of RC with respect to network dimension. We also conduct extensive numerical analysis and simulations to validate our results. In fact, our data show that for reasonable network, protocol, and attack parameters, RC starts to monotonically decrease from node densities around 20, and tends to zero quickly after that. Our data also demonstrate that RC rapidly tends to zero even for small values of network dimension (around 500 m). Besides the two scaling laws, we also find that node density is a double-edged sword in that increase of node density favors both the network side and the attack side. There exists an optimal value for node density that can achieve maximum RC. We are able to determine such optimal node density based on our theoretical analysis. 5) Finally, we propose two types of group deployment to deal with the unscalability of the above two scaling laws.
In particular, we propose logical group deployment to deal with the unscalability brought by node density, in which sensors are deployed in multiple rounds over the whole network. Since sensors in different rounds are predistributed with keys from disjoint key pools, the unscalability issue brought by high node density is alleviated. On the other hand, we propose physical group deployment to deal with the unscalability brought by network dimension, in which sensors are deployed in groups over different areas of the network. Since sensors in different groups are predistributed with keys from partially overlapped or disjoint key pools, the unscalability issue brought by network dimension is alleviated. We believe that our findings are fundamental and identify inherent limitations in existing understanding of key management in randomly deployed WSNs. We show that care should be taken during resource provisioning for secure WSNs. While focusing on protocol scalability in terms of overhead is important, we show it is equally (if not more) critical to consider scalability in terms of security performance. Our work has quantitative significance too. When deployers have a priori knowledge on attack intensities based on historical experience, our closed form expressions can be complemented with existing tools to derive optimum node densities and network dimensions for best performance.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present background on KP protocols, their variants, attack models, and performance metrics. In Section III, we present analysis on the security performance of KP protocols. In Sections IV and V, we study how the KP protocols scale with respect to node density and network dimension, respectively, including both theoretical analysis and simulation data. In Section VI, we propose two types of group deployment to deal with the unscalability brought by the two scaling laws. We finally conclude our paper in Section VII.
II. KEY PREDISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we provide a background on Key Predistribution (KP)-based protocols, attack models, and performance metrics for secure communications in WSNs. We also classify the KP protocols based on several features.
A. Basic KP Protocol

1) Protocol Description:
The seminal approach of key predistribution for randomly deployed WSNs was first proposed in [1] , where the idea is to provision a certain degree of redundancy in key sharing among sensors before deployment. After deployment, neighboring nodes leverage this redundancy to establish pairwise keys between them. There are two stages here. At the key setup stage, each node is predistributed with distinct keys randomly chosen from a large pool of keys, and nodes are deployed randomly. We point out that the predistributed keys are typically not deleted after protocol execution [1] - [4] . They will be used for pairwise key establishment during later node additions due to faults, failures, etc. Fig. 1 shows a deployment instance of 10 nodes, where and . Nodes inside the circle are within communication range of node . The predistributed keys for these nodes are also shown in Fig. 1 . Basic parameters in the KP protocol and notations are presented in Table I .
At the pairwise key establishment stage, neighboring nodes try to establish a pairwise key in between using predistributed keys. First, each node obtains neighborhood key sharing information in its information area. The information area for a node is the area within which the node is aware of information on other nodes and their predistributed keys. We denote this parameter as . For instance, the information area for node in Fig. 1 share key ), they establish a pairwise key directly. To do so, node generates a random pairwise key and sends it to node encrypted with key . However, two physical neighbors may not always share a predistributed key due to randomness in key predistribution and deployment. Here, the nodes will use proxies to construct key paths for pairwise keys. A random key share is transmitted on each key path, and is encrypted/decrypted hop by hop. The pairwise key is a combination (e.g., bitwise XOR) of all key shares. For example, nodes and can use node as a proxy to construct a key path (since nodes and share keys and and are physical neighbors). Note that nodes and cannot establish a pairwise key between them, because they do not share any predistributed key and cannot find any proxy. Finally, pairwise keys are used to encrypt future communications between neighboring nodes.
2) Attack Models: The standard attack model used in WSNs to decipher sensor communications [1] is one where the attacker will launch two types of attacks. In the node capture attack, the attacker physically captures a certain percent of nodes, and discloses their predistributed and pairwise keys. The probability of a node to be captured is . In the link monitor attack, the attacker monitors information on all network links immediately after deployment. Clearly, all communications to and from captured nodes are deciphered by the attacker. Also, by combining disclosed predistributed keys and messages recorded, the attacker can infer some pairwise keys between uncaptured nodes. For instance in Fig. 1 , by capturing node , the attacker obtains key , and thus discloses the pairwise key between nodes and (without capturing either node), since the communication for establishing the pairwise key between nodes and is encrypted by .
When multiple key paths are used to establish a pairwise key, the pairwise key is not disclosed unless all key paths are compromised. A key path is compromised if one node on the path is captured or one link on the path is compromised. A link between two adjacent nodes on the key path is compromised if all shared predistributed keys between those two nodes are disclosed. An uncompromised key path/pairwise key is called a secure key path/pairwise key, respectively. As we can expect, using multiple key paths to establish a pairwise key results in much higher resilience than using only one key path under attack. This is because the chance of the attacker compromising all key paths decreases sharply with the number of key paths used. Although the basic scheme in [1] uses only one key path, in the rest of the paper, we assume all schemes use multiple key paths for pairwise key establishment and conduct analysis based on this. This assumption is beneficial only to the network side and does not affect our conclusions. For a similar reason, we also assume all shared keys on a link are used for pairwise key establishment instead of one of the shared keys as used in the basic scheme in [1] . We emphasize that the above attack model is the de facto one used in many key management works. 1 3) Performance Metrics: To evaluate performance of KP protocols, two metrics are used: Connectivity and Resilience. Connectivity is the probability that two physical neighbors establish a pairwise key between them. While the above definition refers to local connectivity, one could also define global connectivity as probability that the entire network is securely connected, or as the percent of nodes in the largest connected component of the secure network. Since either definition of global connectivity relates to local connectivity [13] , we focus on local connectivity (henceforth called connectivity) in this paper. The other metric is resilience, which is the conditional probability that the pairwise key between two physically neighboring nodes is not disclosed to the attacker given that such pairwise key exists between the two nodes. In other words, in computing resilience, we only consider those links that have pairwise keys established. The effect of links that do not have pairwise keys is considered in metric of connectivity above. The overall goal of any key management protocol is to achieve high connectivity and resilience.
B. KP Protocol Variants
In the above, we described the basic KP protocol in [1] . Many KP protocol variants have been proposed to enhance the basic protocol across several features. However, the core idea of two stages, namely, key predistribution to sensors followed by pairwise key establishment among sensors, is same for all protocols. In this section, we describe these KP protocol variants based on the enhancement of the features in these two stages. Detailed classification KP protocols and the features (and corresponding specifics) that have been extended in those protocols are presented in Table II .
1) Enhancement in Key Setup Stage:
The first feature is the nature of the predistributed keys. In the basic protocol [1] , random keys are predistributed. In the KP protocol variant in [2] , unique pairwise keys are distributed into pairs of sensors chosen randomly. Resilience is enhanced at the cost of poor connectivity in large-scale networks under memory constraints. Works in [3] and [4] extend traditional crypto ideas in [19] and [20] , respectively, to distribute key structures (polynomials or matrix/vectors) instead of keys into sensors to enhance the resilience under low attack intensity.
The second feature is the method in predistributing keys. In the basic protocol [1] , keys are distributed randomly. In [14] , keys are distributed according to well-known optimization designs, which helps increase chances of key sharing. In [4] , quorum-based methods are introduced to guarantee existence of a key path between any two nodes. In [5] , nodes are deployed into grids, and keys distributed in nonadjacent grids are disjoint, while keys predistributed in adjacent grids have a certain degree of overlap. This enhances the chance that two nodes in adjacent grids share keys. The third feature is knowledge of deployment location. The basic KP protocol [1] does not assume the nodes' deployment positions are known a priori. In works like [5] , where certain deployment knowledge is assumed to be known as a priori such that keys can be distributed based on location information to enhance chances of key sharing between neighboring nodes.
2) Enhancement in Pairwise Key Establishment Stage:
The first feature we discuss in the pairwise key establishment stage is the information area of each node. In the basic protocol [1] , each node is aware of the node/key information in its communication range. Thus the information area is within one hop. In [2] , this feature is extended in that nodes are allowed to obtain node/key information in multiple hops to alleviate key path construction. In [4] , nodes are even allowed to construct a key path using a proxy anywhere in the network. In effect, the information area in protocols becomes the entire network.
The second feature is the link usability on a key path. In most works, a link between two nodes is usable in key path construction as long as there is at least one shared key between those two nodes. However, in [2] , the concept was introduced, which allows two neighboring nodes to use the link between them only if they share at least keys. The resilience under low attack intensity (small value of ) is enhanced at the cost of lower resilience under higher attack intensity. The last feature is the number of hops allowed on a key path. In the basic protocol [1] , a key path can have an arbitrary number of hops. However, in [2] , [4] , [8] , etc., there are certain bounds on the maximum number of hops on a key path. Clearly this feature will affect the number of key paths constructed, and consequently affect the resilience of the pairwise keys established. More hops imply better chances of key establishment at the cost of increased communication/computation overhead and vice versa.
III. DERIVATION OF RESILIENT CONNECTIVITY
In this section, we first introduce our security metric called Resilient Connectivity (RC), followed by its derivation. Before the derivation of RC, we identify and abstract all the parameters that impact RC in all KP protocols and list them in Table III . We then derive a general expression for RC incorporating these parameters to analyze KP protocols scalability. This generalizes our findings to all KP protocols. 
A. Preliminaries
The traditional metrics to evaluate performance of KP protocols are connectivity and resilience. These two metrics are disjoint in that connectivity measures only probability that physical neighbors can establish pairwise keys, irrespective of how secure these keys are from being disclosed by the attacker. Resilience measures only how secure the established pairwise keys between neighbors are from being disclosed by the attacker, irrespective of the probability of physical neighbors establishing pairwise keys between them. In order to quantify security performance, we combine the above two metrics and define RC. Formally, . There exists a strong physical meaning for RC, which is the probability that two physically neighboring sensors can communicate securely (with a secure pairwise key) under attacks. RC naturally encompasses both connectivity and resilience, and is our metric to evaluate the KP protocols scalability w.r.t. security performance.
We discussed various KP protocols in Section II. Since the core idea of all KP protocols follow two stages (key setup stage and pairwise key establishment stage), all enhancements can be captured using certain parameters. We now introduce these parameters and derive their expressions. They will be used in our analysis when we derive expression of RC. Generalization of these parameters during RC derivation generalizes our analysis to all KP protocols. 1) Key Setup Parameter : As described earlier, there are various aspects to predistributed keys, such as, key structure distribution in [3] , [4] , unique pairwise key distribution in [2] , optimization design-based distribution in [14] , and location aided key distribution in [5] , [9] . They can all be captured by two parameters, and , which denote the probability that two neighboring sensors share exact keys (or key structures), and the probability a single key (or key structure) is disclosed to the attacker, respectively. The former captures the positive side of key redundancy in that it reflects the chance of direct key sharing and the chance of nearby proxies being helpful. The latter captures the negative side of key redundancy in that it reflects the chance that keys are disclosed by the attacker. In other words, two protocols with the same and will have the same security performance, irrespective of the nature of keys (or key structures) being predistributed.
2) Pairwise Key Establishment Parameters
: The basic operation in pairwise key establishment is constructing key paths using the links with shared keys. Three parameters that naturally affect the security performance are: the amount of information obtained by each node for key paths construction, the longest key paths allowed to be constructed, and the minimum requirement for a link to be usable in key path construction. These three parameters can be captured by three parameters, respectively: the size of information area , the maximum number of hops on one key path , and the minimum number of shared keys for a link to be usable
. A large value of or makes more key paths available at the cost of communication/computation overhead. A large value of achieves better resilience at low attack intensity at the cost of poorer resilience at high attack intensity [2] . In Table III , we show expressions of the above five parameters for various KP protocols. In Table III , same grid, edge adj. grids, and corner adj. grids denote the cases when two neighboring sensors are in the same grid, in two edge adjacent grids, and in two corner adjacent grids, respectively. In Table III , denotes the size of each grid, and , which is the probability that a key (or key structure) is disclosed where is the number of captured nodes, is the minimum number of captured nodes required for the key (or key structure) to be disclosed, and is the probability that the key (or key structure) is distributed in a node. To summarize, we have identified and abstracted all parameters that impact RC in all KP protocols using the above five parameters. These parameters will be used in our analysis of RC in the next section. Since RC is our performance metric for scalability, our results can be generalized for any KP protocol by substituting appropriate expressions for these parameters for different protocols during the analysis.
B. Derivation of RC
We now discuss the derivation of RC for any general form of the above parameters. Certain other parameters, which are impacted by the parameters presented in Table III , will be used to derive RC and their notations are presented in Table IV . In our analysis, the attack model is the one discussed in Section II-A2. Table V gives the sequence of formulas in deriving RC. We present here a basic overview of the derivation process. A more detailed description is in the Appendix.
In Table V (1), is the probability that an arbitrary uncaptured node (say node ) cannot construct a secure key path to its uncaptured physical neighbor (say node ) within 's information area . is the probability that uncaptured node cannot construct a secure key path to uncaptured node within 's information area given that node cannot construct a secure key path to node within 's information area . Consequently, is the probability that two arbitrary uncaptured neighboring nodes and are able to construct a secure key path in between. This value, times the Remarks: Note that . While there have been prior works on analyzing connectivity, no rigorous analysis on resilience has been conducted, except on the expected percent of disclosed predistributed keys. The difficulty is due to significant complexities in considering the nodes/keys overlaps among multiple key paths. In this paper, we have rigorously derived RC, and Connectivity can be derived in the same way as RC by just substituting . If solely Resilience is interested, it can naturally be analyzed via . To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that enables Resilience of KP protocols to be analyzed.
IV. SCALING LAW ONE: SCALABILITY WITH RESPECT TO NODE DENSITY
A. The Scaling Law
We now present our first finding on the scalability of KP protocols with respect to node density in terms of RC. Based on the derivation of RC in Section III-B, we can treat RC as a function of node density (denoted as ), given other parameters fixed. We now have the following theorem:
Theorem 1: For any KP protocol , network parameters , attack intensity , (Proof in [21] ). The first part of Theorem 1 states that for any nonzero node capture probability , performance of KP protocols does not always increase with node density . There exist densities and , where RC at a smaller node density is higher than RC at a larger node density for any protocol and network parameters. The second part of the theorem states that when . It implies there is a finite value of node density to achieve optimal performance for any KP protocol. To conclude, KP protocols are not scalable with respect to node density in The fundamental explanation for the unscalability of KP protocols stems from redundancy in key predistribution inherent in all KP protocols, and the presence of attacks. Each sensor is provisioned with multiple keys, and each key is usually shared by multiple sensors. Clearly, redundancy helps the network side overcome deployment randomness to discover more secure neighbors and proxies. However, this redundancy can be a double-edged sword. Attackers can also leverage redundancy to disclose more keys and communications. This redundancy is further amplified when node density increases. When the node density increases, the number of nodes and the number of captured nodes increase. We can then show that (from the expressions for in Table III ) when the number of captured nodes increases. When , we can see from (7) in Table V that . Thus from (2) to (6), we can see that . This conclusion holds for all KP schemes since all the expressions of in Table III approach 1 when one of the three parameters approaches infinity. As shown above, this is due to redundancy in key predistribution, which when amplified, causes degradation in RC.
B. Numerical Results
In the following, we conduct numerical studies on sensitivity of RC to node density for different protocol variants under varying node capture probabilities , number of keys , maximum number of hops allowed in a key path , key structure degree , and probability of key sharing . Unless otherwise stated, the following are default values: , m m, m,
. By default, keys are predistributed randomly without deployment knowledge.
The first observation we make from Figs. 2-5 is that RC does not monotonically increase with . Second, in all figures there is a point in density, beyond which RC monotonically decreases. We denote this as density threshold . In fact, indicates the critical point at which the attacker defeats the network in the tug of war between them (discussed above) in terms of redundancy exploitation. As we discuss in the following, the result of this war ( ) is different for different protocols and parameters.
In Fig. 2 , we study RC versus under different . When is large, RC decreases from lower values in density (smaller ). This is because a large means a powerful attacker. Increasing density means the attacker can capture more nodes and disclose more keys. Consequently, is low (near zero) when is large. However, when decreases it implies a moderate attacker. Increasing density (up to a point) will better facilitate the network side, and thus increases. For example, when , RC increases up to before decreasing. When decreases further, increases. To demonstrate the soundness of our analysis, we report data comparing numerical and simulation data for the case of RC versus in Fig. 3 (other parameters are default). As we can see, the numerical data match very well with simulation data. We note that simulation data are lower than analysis data due to network boundary effect.
In Figs. 4 and 5, we study RC versus under different and . When and are small, is small. This is because attack impacts are stronger than network benefits leading to more pairwise keys disclosed under smaller (key pool size) and smaller (number of hops) even at low densities. Increasing density further will better facilitate the attacker. When and are large, the attacker effectiveness decreases, which increases . We point out that there is a relationship between and from the perspective of key disclosure. A small means fewer keys are disclosed per node capture and vice versa. This effect is opposite to that of . The trend is as follows: when is small, is large, and when is large, is small. Note, however, that RC increases with for a fixed value of up to a certain point only. Beyond a certain value of , RC starts to decrease for any given , as connectivity starts going down significantly.
Note that we used the basic communication model here, where the sensor's communication range is a circular disc. In [21] , we conduct further investigations on RC versus under irregular communication models like degree of irregularity (DOI) model [22] . We observe that all our findings and trends still hold true.
C. Discussion
We wish to emphasize here an important observation from the above figures. Note that RC monotonically increases up to , after which it monotonically decreases in all figures. Towards this extent, we state the following conjecture:
Conjecture: For any KP protocol , any network parameters and any attack intensity , 1) there is one and only , where RC is maximum; 2) : ; 3)
: . A rigorous proof of this conjecture is still open. Here we provide an informal argument. An increase in node density will be leveraged by both network and attacker. From the perspective of RC, it means improved connectivity or decreased resilience, respectively. The overall impact to RC is contingent on which factor dominates. Initially, increase in node density improves connectivity significantly, which increases RC. Considering there is an upper bound on connectivity (at most one), there is a point from which resilience degradation always dominates with increase in density, resulting in density threshold ( ) from which RC monotonically decreases. However, as our data show, is sensitive to the protocol, attack, and network parameters. Given all parameters, we are able to determine the optimal node density to achieve maximum RC based on our analysis in Section III-B.
V. SCALING LAW TWO: SCALABILITY WITH RESPECT TO NETWORK DIMENSION
A. The Scaling Law
Based on our earlier derivation of RC in Section III-B, we see that RC is dependent on network dimension . In the following, we denote as resilient connectivity for a network with dimension , with other parameters fixed. We now have the following theorem:
Theorem 2: For any KP protocol , network parameters , attack intensity , 1) ; 2) (proof in [21] ).
Theorem 2 states that for any nonzero node capture probability , performance monotonically decreases (to 0) as network dimension increases for any protocol and network parameters. This demonstrates the unscalability of KP protocols in terms of security performance with respect to network dimension. Based on the theorem above, we have the second scaling law for KP protocols.
Scaling law 2: KP protocols are not scalable in terms of RC with respect to network dimension.
When network dimension increases, the number of nodes increases. This increases the redundancy in key sharing among nodes leveraged by the attacker, which is the fundamental reason for the unscalability of KP protocols with respect to network dimension. Specifically, when the network dimension increases, the number of nodes and the number of captured nodes increase. Similar to the discussions in Section IV, when the number of captured nodes increases. This further results in the fact that and . This conclusion holds for all KP schemes since all the expressions of in Table III approach 1 when one of the three parameters approaches infinity.
B. Numerical Results
In the following, we conduct a numerical study on the sensitivity of resilient connectivity (RC) to network dimension under different density . Other parameters are set as default. In Fig. 6 , we observe that RC monotonically decreases as increases for all . We also see that density threshold (discussed earlier) decreases as increases. This is because when the network dimension is larger, more nodes are captured, resulting in more powerful attack impacts (even at low densities). Consequently, RC decreases from an early as increases and vice versa.
Due to space limitations, we do not show the sensitivity of RC to under other network parameters (e.g., , , , and ). Basically, the impact of the above network parameters on RC here is similar to what we discussed in Section IV.
VI. GROUP DEPLOYMENT
In this section, we propose two types of group deployment to deal with the unscalability of KP protocols with respect to node density and network dimension.
A. Logical Group Deployment
As discussed in Section IV, high node density could result in security degradation in KP protocols. This is because given network dimension, the average number of captured nodes increases with node density, along with the number of predistributed keys and compromise secure communications in the network further. Unfortunately though, high node density is required in many applications for sensing and connectivity under faults/failures.
Intuitively, it seems a dilemma to achieve high security performance in WSNs with high node density. However, the above two factors do not necessarily contradict each other. High node density hurts secure communications not because there are too many nodes in a unit area, but because there are too many nodes in a unit area whose predistributed keys come from a single key pool. If we maintain the number of nodes in a unit area, while decreasing the number of nodes sharing a single key pool in a unit area, we can achieve high security and high performance simultaneously.
We propose logical group deployment to achieve high node density without sacrificing secure communications. In particular, we deploy sensor nodes in multiple rounds. In each round, a certain number of sensors are deployed to the network, and these sensors are predistributed with keys from the same key pool. On the other hand, sensors deployed in different rounds are predistributed with keys from disjoint key pools. In other words, sensors are deployed in multiple logical groups, any two of which share no predistributed keys. By deploying nodes in this way, we achieve arbitrarily high node density (with multiple rounds), while at the same time achieve high security as security is decided by the node density in a single round.
Our logical group deployment resolves the dilemma between high node density and high security at the cost of two nodes in different rounds not being able to communicate with each other. This is because sensors in different rounds use disjoint key pools, and cannot establish a pairwise key in between. However, this will not be an issue as long as node density determined by each round is high enough to achieve node connectivity within each round with high probability. In many applications, a sensor does not need to communicate with all neighbors. It suffices if each node can communicate with a few neighbors to achieve connectivity and redundancy. However, in the case of low density in the network (due to faults/failures), or if the base-station desires collaboration between nodes in multiple rounds, we can extend our logical group deployment to let any two key pools in two different groups to have a small percentage of overlap (e.g., 20%). In some sense, this technique actually sets to a very high value, which as argued above improves RC when node density increases.
In Fig. 7 , we study the sensitivity of RC to node density under different for KP protocols for traditional one-time deployment and our logical group deployment. The node density decided by all nodes is , and other parameters are set as default. Under logical group deployment, we divide sensors in two rounds with the same size, and the two key pools in two rounds are disjoint. We see that when node density is high, RC is better in logical group deployment compared to that of traditional one-time deployment, especially when node capture probability is high. However, when node density is low, RC in logical group deployment may be worse than that in traditional one-time deployment, especially when node capture probability is low. This is because under low node capture probability, the threshold density is high. RC increases with node density, in which case logical group deployment should not be used. To sum up, our logical group deployment helps to enhance security performance when node density is high. This also justifies that adoption of our logical group deployment under high node density will not hurt connectivity much as node density in each round is still high. 
B. Physical Group Deployment
As we discussed in Section V, large network dimension could result in security degradation in KP protocols. This is because given node density, the average number of captured nodes increases with the network dimension. The more nodes become captured, the larger the percentage of predistributed keys the attacker can compromise. Decreasing network dimension certainly helps; however, many sensor networks are envisaged to be deployed in a large area, such as the battlefields or international borders.
Similar to the argument above, large network dimension hurts secure communications not simply because there are too many nodes in the whole network, but because there are too many nodes in the network whose predistributed keys come from a single key pool. If we can maintain the total number of nodes in the network, while decreasing the number of nodes sharing a single key pool in the network, we can achieve both high security and large network dimension simultaneously.
In this paper, we propose physical group deployment to achieve large network dimension without sacrificing secure communications. In particular, we deploy sensor nodes in multiple groups. In each group, a certain number of sensors are deployed to a specific area of the network, and these sensors are predistributed with keys from the same key pool. On the other hand, sensors in different groups are deployed in different areas of the network, and are predistributed with keys from partially overlapped or disjoint key pools. A simple example is first dividing the network into multiple disjoint grids, and then deploying one group of sensors in each grid. By deploying nodes in this way, we can achieve an arbitrarily large network dimension (with multiple groups), while at the same time achieving high security as security is mainly decided by the dimension of a single group. 2 In our physical group deployment, we assume the knowledge as to which sensor belongs to which group is known as a priori, which is a common assumption in KP protocols [9] , [23] . Sensors in adjacent groups share different key pools with limited overlap to facilitate neighbor group communications, while key pools of nonadjacent groups share no overlap. To derive RC under group deployment for general KP protocols, we point out that there are two types of relationships between two adjacent groups, i.e., edge adjacent or corner adjacent. The derivation of RC under group deployment thus has to consider the key pool overlaps between adjacent edges, which is not the case in traditional one-time random deployment discussed in Section III. The derivations of RC under group deployment are not presented here due to space limitations. Interested readers may refer to [21] for derivations.
In Fig. 8 , we study the sensitivity of RC to network dimension under different for KP protocols for traditional one-time deployment and our physical group deployment. The overall network dimension is . Under physical group deployment, we divide the network into four groups, each has dimension . By default, we set the percent of key overlaps among edge adjacent and corner adjacent grids as and , respectively (as in [9] ). We see that RC is consistently better in physical group deployment compared to that of traditional one-time deployment. Thus, physical group deployment always helps enhance security, which is a little different from the case in logical group deployment we discussed above.
Summary: To summarize, our strategies for logical and physical group deployment alleviate concerns on decreasing RC with increasing node density and network dimension. For a given set of parameters, when it may be impossible to increase RC beyond a point for flat (or homogeneous) deployments, our group deployment strategies can improve RC. Note that an increase in RC in group deployment has application level constraints like the number of groups, the number of nodes in each group, the number of keys in each group, and overhead. Under such constraints our analysis can help deployers make informed decisions on RC increase, and managing constraints imposed by the network, its operation and overhead.
VII. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we conducted an investigation on scalability of key predistribution (KP) protocols in randomly deployed WSNs. We find that KP protocols are not scalable in terms of security performance, due to redundancy in key distribution. The significance of our work also extends to other network systems that utilize redundancy. In secure overlay forwarding systems [24] , while redundancy in system connectivity enables clients to find more paths to the server, attackers can leverage high connectivity to disclose the server rapidly (and attack it). For file-sharing systems [25] , while content replication enhances load sharing, it can be exploited to disrupt system quality by corrupting popular files. Our work here can be extended to such systems to understand their trade-offs and provision resources carefully.
APPENDIX
Theoretical Derivation for RC: From Table V, we have , where is the probability that an arbitrary node (node ) cannot construct a secure key path to its physical neighbor (node ) within 's communication disk
. is the probability that given two uncaptured neighboring nodes and , node cannot construct a secure key path to node with all proxies in 's information area given that node cannot construct a secure key path to node with all proxies in 's information area . We introduce a new term, , which is the probability that node can construct a secure key path to node with all proxies along the path within the overlapping communication disks of these two nodes. We have . We first derive . We have . Based on the definition of , we have the expression in Table V (2) . We now derive . We have . By Bayer's Theorem, can be represented as , where and ( is a subset of ). We then obtain the expression in Table V (3) . Now we derive and . Recall that is the probability that node can construct a secure key path to a physical neighbor node within communication disk of node with minimum hops given both nodes and are uncaptured. The expression for this when is given by Table V (4). Note that is given in Table III and  is given in Table V (7) , where is given in Table III . The probability that, given two nodes within the communication disk of node , denoted as nodes and , node is a physical neighbor of node and node shares at least one predistributed key with node , is . This will be used in deriving below. To derive , we divide nodes in the communication disk of node (except nodes and ) into disjoint groups . A node is in group if node can construct a secure key path from itself to node within the communication disk of node with minimum hops. We first derive . Considering there are other nodes in the network excluding nodes and , the probability that there are nodes, excluding node , in the communication disk of node is . Here in Table V (8) is the probability that there are out of total nodes in the communication disk of a node given that is the probability that a node in the network falls in the communication disk of the node . Notice is the number of physical neighbors, excluding node , of node . Given nodes in the communication disk of node , the probability that there are uncaptured nodes in is , in which denotes [ Table V ( 11) ]. The probability that at least one of these nodes shares key with node and is a physical neighbor of node is , which is denoted as in Table V (12) . Hence, we have the expression in Table V (5) .
We now analyze for . Given nodes in the communication disk of node , excluding node , the probability that there are uncaptured nodes in is . Notice there is at least one uncaptured node in , so can be at most. Besides there is no secure key path between nodes and within the communication disk of node with fewer than hops. We denote as the probability that there is at least one secure key path from a node in to node with minimum hops , given nodes excluding node in the communication disk of node and nodes in . Then we obtain the expression in Table V (6) .
The expression of can be derived iteratively. Given nodes in , the number of nodes in is at most , denoted by . Notice that the probability that there are uncaptured nodes in is in Table V (13) . Thus, the probability that there is at least one secure key path from a node in to node with minimum hops , given nodes excluding node in the communication disk of node and nodes in , is given in Table V (9) . According to the definition, is the probability that there is at least one secure key path from a node in to node with minimum hop 1, given nodes excluding node in the communication disk of node and nodes in . This is also the probability that at least one node in shares a key with node and is a physical neighbor of node . Therefore, we have the expression in Table V (10) . We now derive . Recall that is the probability that a node can construct a secure key path to a physical neighbor node within the overlapped communication disks of both nodes, with a minimum of hops given both nodes are uncaptured. Consequently, instead of considering the total communication disk , we only need to consider the overlapped area , where [2] . The derivation of thus is the same as that for except that we replace by . By substituting and into Table V (2) and V (3), we can obtain and , hence arriving at the closed form expression for RC in Table V (1). 
